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In 1970, radical Chicano activists swept into office in Crystal City, Texas, taking 
control of almost all of the institutions of local government in the small South 
Texas town. Part of a sophisticated political project by Mexican American Youth 
Organization (MAYO) activists, including José Angel Gutiérrez and María Luz 
Gutiérrez, the Crystal City victory drew on decades of local activism, connections 
with progressive labor unions in Texas and the Midwest and resources from 
federal civil rights programs and the Ford Foundation. Theories of internal 
colonization and cultural nationalism guided a strategy of grassroots mobilization 
and third-party political organizing. This approach initially showed great promise, 
allowing the activists to consolidate power locally in the face of intense opposition 
while expanding their political reach. Candidates running under the umbrella of 
the newly formed La Raza Unida party went on to win office in other nearby cities 
and counties, but ran unsuccessfully for state offices. While in power, the 
Chicano activists were able to desegregate the school curriculum and staff, bring 
large numbers of previously disenfranchised citizens into the political process 
and institute policies of community control of economic assets, including an 
attempt to municipalize nearby natural gas fields. By 1978, however, the Crystal 
City experiment was over, politically outflanked by opponents and crumbling 
internally from dissension and accusations of improper behavior. 
Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the 1970s there was a broad 
national phenomenon of activists moving from anti-war, civil rights and pro-poor 
organizing into local government, successfully winning control of numerous cities 
and counties across the United States. Although activists of all backgrounds 
made this transition, they relied upon different theoretical frameworks, followed 
different trajectories and faced very different barriers and opposition. An unusual 
moment of overlap between radical black and Chicano activists on the one hand, 
and moderate, largely white and New Left progressives on the other hand, came 
through the Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies 
(CASLPP). The radicals provided a broad and comprehensive vision of a utopian 
future grounded in grassroots activism and the use of confrontation to gain 
control of the institutions of local government. The moderate progressives who 
predominated in CASLPP brought a pragmatic approach of compromise and 
coalition-building grounded in respect for the structures of local administration. 
The oral histories and archival collections located in the Cornell Progressive 
Cities and Neighborhoods Collection, Wayne State’s Walter Reuther Library and 
university and city archives across Texas provide tantalizing glimpses into this 
rich historical moment of progressive local public administration. 
The dramatic events in Crystal City remain one of the central moments in the 
history of radical Chicano activism. Although the Movimiento at various times had 
close ties with organized labor, African-American civil rights groups, liberation 
theologians, student New Left organizers and others, its history reflects the 
exceptional and ambiguous place of Chicanos in the U.S. The Gutiérrez 
organization in South Texas was the only one of the four main arms of the 
national Chicano Movimiento to make such a clear transition from mass 
mobilization into electoral politics. The Movimiento was never unified and 
cohesive, and at the end of the 1960s it was seen as centered around four 
charismatic men, each with a different organizing style: César Chávez’s labor 
organizing in California; Rudolfo “Corky” Gonzales’s youth and cultural nationalist 
organizing in Colorado; Reies López Tijerina’s land rights activism in New 
Mexico; and José Angel Gutiérrez’s electoral mobilization in South Texas. 
Tensions between these figures over strategy, prestige and identity politics 
contributed to the movement’s fragmentation in the late 1970s, and in more 
recent years, feminist and queer scholarship within Chicano studies has brought 
into question the privileging of these men in the history of theMovimiento. 
Lessons of the 1960s The successful takeover in 1970 was made possible by 
lessons learned in the decade before. In 1963 a slate of five Chicano candidates 
won election to the city council after an energetic poll tax and voter registration 
campaign led by the local chapter of the Political Association of Spanish 
Speaking Organizations (PASSO) and with help from the Teamsters. The fragile 
coalition fell apart, however, in the face of concerted resistance by Anglo citizens 
angry at the takeover who used economic pressure to punish the elected 
Chicanos. By 1965, a racially mixed and politically reactionary coalition was able 
to defeat the PASSO candidates. Despite the ephemeral results, the 1963 
elections proved that it was possible to overcome the structural barriers to 
electing a slate of radical Chicanos in Crystal City. 
In 1969, escalating anger among Mexican-American high school students and 
their families provided the political opening that led to the 1970 takeover. 
Although the student population was overwhelmingly Mexican-American, the 
student organizations were dominated by Anglos. Furthermore, dropout rates for 
Mexican-American students were many times that of Anglos. In 1969, anger 
crystallized over the highly symbolic and openly racist selection of cheerleaders 
and a homecoming queen. Mexican-American students walked out. Gutiérrez 
organizers and others from MAYO helped to provide focus to and support for the 
student protests, creating structures and accessing outside support to counter 
attempts at co-optation and demobilization by the Anglo elite. 
Becoming a Movement 
As Calvin Trillin wrote in the New Yorker, “The boycott became a movement” that 
year. Carefully building support family by family, using children to radicalize 
parents and parents to support their children, the organizers focused anger about 
the school inequities into the electoral arena. In order to avoid a repeat of the 
1965 losses, organizers formed a third party, La Raza Unida (“The People 
United”), which could provide structure and ongoing mobilization to support the 
candidates. A combination of class- and ethnic-based organizing was used to 
bring a majority of voters firmly withinLa Raza Unida’s umbrella, leaving its 
opponents isolated. The central innovation demonstrated by the Crystal City La 
Raza Unida was the combination of a focus on individual mobilization and voter 
discipline with a radical structural critique of society. 
This structural critique was grounded in the ideas of internal colonialism and 
cultural nationalism, with the school system seen as a central instrument for 
maintaining the colonial relationship. When La Raza Unida candidates won a 
majority of seats on the school board and elected José Angel Gutíérrez chair of 
the board, they were able to bring aggressively decolonizing policies and 
practices, rather than gently reforming ones, to the monocultural curriculum and 
school staff. The substantive gains made in the school system became La Raza 
Unida’s most significant accomplishment. In 1976, David Gelber noted 
in Working Papers that “since Raza took over the school system, the drop-out 
rate for third graders has declined from 37.4 percent to 2.4 percent” (emphasis in 
original). 
A focus on cultural nationalism permeated much of the Chicano Movimiento. 
Articulated in foundational texts such as El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán (1969) and 
Rudolfo “Corky” Gonzales’s epic poem Yo Soy Joaquín (1968), Chicano cultural 
nationalism drew together ideas of identity, territorial control and class 
consciousness. For the Crystal City activists, seizing local political power was 
more than a way to redress local inequities—it was to be the first step in a long-
term project of retaking Aztlán, the mythical Aztec homeland located in the U.S. 
Southwest. The idea of Aztlán overlaid language, territory, history and myth in 
order to reframe the identity of the Mexican-American as not subaltern or 
defeated, but proud mestizo inheritors of the land acquired by the U.S. in the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Beginning with “I am Joaquín, lost in a 
world of confusion, / caught up in the whirl of a gringo society,” Gonzales’s poem 
ends with “My blood is pure. / I am Aztec prince and Christian Christ.” This 
stirring call for a militant Chicano identity was taken both figuratively and literally 
by activists; Aztlán was a radical utopian vision connecting social change, 
territorial control and ethnic identity. 
By the mid-1970s, the faultlines that would lead to the fragmentation and failure 
of La Raza Unida’s governance in Crystal City were already apparent. The title of 
David Gelber’s 1976 requiem for Crystal City in Working Papers, “Crystal City’s 
Cracked Promise,” suggests the intense disappointment felt by participants and 
observers as the radical regime devolved into accusations of nepotism, 
profiteering and worse. Coupled with severe external pressures, including 
investigations by the Texas Rangers, bitter feuds with Democratic Party officials 
and a disastrous showing in the 1978 gubernatorial election, La Raza Unida and 
the Crystal City experiment in radical Chicano progressive local governance fell 
apart. In 1979 the Gutíerrezes went into self-imposed exile in the Pacific 
Northwest, not returning to Texas until 1986. 
Lessons from Crystal City 
There were important theoretical, stylistic and strategic differences between the 
radicalCristaleros and the more moderate progressives in cities like Madison and 
Berkeley. The Crystal City activists based their approach on the radical systemic 
critique of internal colonization and cultural nationalism, and were willing to 
create dramatic confrontations and disruptions in the process of governance. 
They made little pretense of trying to appeal to the average middle-American, 
and rather than seeking alliances with sympathetic politicians, they excoriated 
them as sellouts and worse. Most progressive city administrations were much 
more moderate and pragmatic, matching a limited structural critique of inequality 
and disempowerment with mechanisms available to state and local governments. 
A focus on public ownership and control was in line with historical examples in 
the U.S. as well as international examples from Canada and Europe. Although 
many progressive activists held deep critiques of the underlying basis of modern 
American capitalism and long-term goals to bring about systemic change, the 
core elements of their practice were real world compromises and alliance-
building with mainstream politicians. 
Although the radical Chicanos in Crystal City had a far deeper structural critique, 
they were equally limited by the tools and mechanisms of local government. 
Fundamentally, dilemmas posed by cultural nationalism and internal colonization 
could not be resolved from within the institutions of public administration in a 
small South Texas town. Just as with radical Black Power activists in Oakland 
and elsewhere, the highly symbolic capture of territorial and institutional control 
was central to the project. And to the extent that local government had long been 
used as mechanisms of repression and emasculation, seizing control of these 
arms of the state provided a tremendous sense of empowerment. But unlike the 
white progressive activists, who were generally able to work effectively on the 
edges of local Democratic Party structures, the ongoing involvement of the local 
Democratic Party in maintaining structures of racial oppression led to the building 
of a third party base. This third party approach was meant to be the bridge 
between the radical critique and the implementation of a radical agenda, but the 
external structural barriers, combined with internal dissent, were impossible to 
overcome. 
The brief overlap between the radical Chicanos in Crystal City and the 
progressives in the CASLPP suggests to me a “could have been” of local 
progressive politics in the U.S. rife with missed opportunities and the hints of a 
different future. The moderate progressives never acquired the grassroots 
sophistication of the Chicano Movimiento, while the Movimiento activists never 
gained the comfort the moderates had with compromise, coalition-building and 
working within the institutions of government. In an alternate reality, the moderate 
activists would have learned the importance of sustained grassroots organizing 
and strategies for achieving this from the radical Chicanos, perhaps acquiring the 
tools to counter opposition from right-wing and business interests. The radical 
Chicanos, on the other hand, would have been able to connect their powerful 
utopian vision with mechanisms grounded in institutional realities. While the 
gains each group made were very real and should not be dismissed, the 
limitations of each meant that the real gains were more symbolic than 
substantive. And though both groups proved that change was possible, they 
failed to implement those changes on a national or regional scale. 
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